Germany's Immigration Dilemma
How Can Germany Attract the W orkers It Needs?
Tamar Jacoby
T AMAR JACOBY is President of I mmigrationWorks USA. She w as a Bosch Public Policy Fellow at the American Academy in
Berlin last fall.
Months after its publication last August, Thilo Sarrazin's book,
itself), is still a runaway bestseller in his native country. The book makes an apocalyptic argument -- that immigrants are
destroying Germany. In Sarrazin's view, most of the country's large Arab and Turkish populations are not just unwilling
but also unable to integrate, and the nation must take urgent steps, starting with a radical overhaul of its welfare
system, to avoid a hastening demise.
The German political elite could hardly ignore the debate. Sarrazin is no uncredentialed radical: he has been an executive
at Deutsche Bahn, the Berlin finance minister, and a member of the board of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Germany's
central bank. W ithin days of the book's publication and an incendiary follow-on interview in which he mentioned a Jewish
"gene" (an especially taboo subject in Germany), he was kicked out of the center-left Social Democratic Party.
Politicians on the center right were not sure whether to co-opt or criticize him. Chancellor Angela Merkel denounced the
book but registered her own concerns about immigration, declaring that multiculturalism had "utterly failed" in Germany.
President Christian W ulff, who, like Merkel, hails from the Christian Democratic Union, tried to put some distance
between the state and Sarrazin, claiming that Islam "belonged" in Germany. But Horst Seehofer, prime minister of
Bavaria and leader of the CDU's sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), chose to side with Sarrazin, announcing
that Germany did not need any more immigrants from "other" cultures and calling for a crackdown on "integration
refusers."
The challenges of immigration are not a new topic in Germany. For decades, both native-born Germans and newcomers to
the country clung to the myth that the
arrived in the 1960s and 1970s to drive the German economic miracle, were not going to stay permanently. Not
surprisingly, as a consequence, many of those who did stay failed to integrate successfully. Over the decades, Germans
have grown increasingly concerned over immigration, yet their anxieties often remain unexpressed -- perfect fodder for
someone such as Sarrazin. Still, even as the Sarrazin controversy dragged on through the fall, a parallel and more
constructive debate about immigration began to emerge in Germany. In the ruling coalition, ministries, media, and civic
forums, people were talking not just about the German Turkish population and its struggle with integration but also
about what some identified as the "migrants we need" -- highly skilled knowledge workers -- and how to attract them to
Germany.
BEST AND BRIGHTEST
It was just a decade ago, after years of denial, that Germans began to recognize that Germany was an "immigration
country." Legislation passed in 2000 opened the way to citizenship for the children of the
commission led by former Bundestag President Rita Süssmuth underlined the need to recruit immigrant workers and do
more to integrate those foreigners already in Germany. A second law, which went into effect in 2005, established a
national office of immigration and integration and created several new types of visas for labor immigrants. It also made
government "integration courses," including 600 hours of instruction in German, available to all newcomers. By the end of
the decade, a vast national network of service providers had emerged to administer these courses and other services --
at a cost of some 140 million euros ($186 million) a year. (The U.S. government, in comparison, spent $18 million last
year to facilitate integration.)
The Süssmuth commission made the recruitment of a highly skilled work force the centerpiece of its proposal to overhaul
the immigration system. Already in 2001, in Germany and around the world, advances in communications and
transportation were eroding the walls that once defined national labor markets, and governments were starting to grasp
that they were in a race for workplace talent. Just as in the nineteenth century, when powerful states fought one another
for territory and natural resources, now they were competing for brain power: the scientists, engineers, entrepreneurs,
and high-end business managers who fuel the dynamism of the international economy.
The global race for skilled workers raged through the economic boom years of the past decade. As many saw it, Australia
and Canada had the most appealing and effective immigration policies: both rely on point systems to draw international
talent, selecting for immigrants with language skills and higher-than-average educational levels. Other countries soon
made their own efforts to attract the highly qualified. Between 1998 and 2000, the United States more than doubled its
quota for skilled workers admitted on temporary H-1B visas. In 2001, Germany made an exception to its 1973 ban on
labor immigration, introducing a much-heralded Green Card to attract information technology (IT) professionals. France,
Ireland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom soon developed similar initiatives. And in 2007, the European Union
announced its ambitious supranational version of outreach to global talent: the Blue Card, designed to lure workers by,
among other things, making it easier for them to move from job to job on the continent. (EU member states must
incorporate Blue Card requirements in domestic legislation by June 2011.)
But Germany's effort to attract the best and brightest has not worked out as planned. In some cases, policymakers got
cold feet; in others, initiatives failed to produce the expected results. The Green Card attracted far fewer IT specialists
than anticipated -- less than 16,000 over three years. A push to create a German point system was derailed in 2004. The
landmark immigration law that went into effect in 2005 created several new employment-based visas for highly qualified
scientists, engineers, health professionals, university teachers, and managers (amendments passed in the years since
have made entry easier for international students and investors). But the response has been underwhelming. Only a few
hundred immigrants take up Germany's offer of permanent residence each year: in 2009, just 169 did. Another few
thousand knowledge workers enter annually on temporary visas. University students find Germany more attractive:
60,000 are now arriving each year. But at the end of their studies, only some 6,000 of them choose to stay. And indeed,
for several years now, more people have left Germany than have entered the country with an eye toward settling there.
Many Sarrazin supporters are undoubtedly heartened by such news, but the truth is that the German economy is booming
-- according to estimates, it expanded by 3.7 percent in 2010 -- and the skilled-worker shortage poses a serious threat
to continued growth. According to one recent survey, by the Association of German Chambers of Industry and Commerce,
70 percent of German companies are having trouble finding master artisans, technicians, and other skilled laborers. The
Association of German Engineers reports that there are 36,000 unfilled engineering positions across the country, and an
association of IT companies estimates that there are 43,000 openings in the information field. The labor problem is
particularly acute among the smaller, often rural manufacturing companies known as the
Germany's exporting prowess and provide 70 percent of its private-sector jobs. According to an estimate by the German
Institute for Economic Research, the skilled-worker shortage is costing the country 15 billion euros ($20 billion) a year. If
the problem is left unattended, these numbers are only going to get worse: the German fertility rate has fallen to a
startling 1.38 children per woman, and the existing work force is aging rapidly -- by 2020, the carmaker Daimler expects
that more than half its workers will be over 50 years old.
SAY ING GOODBY E
The German public is divided over how to address this skilled-labor shortage. Business advocates bristle with urgency
and, at times, disbelief over the country's seeming lack of interest in attracting needed foreign workers. Even the broader
public, so entranced by Sarrazin, seems to recognize that something is amiss: stories about able and attractive
foreigners leaving Germany are a staple in the media, including on a Sunday reality television show,
Deutschland! Die Ausw anderer
tackle the problem. Many in the government cling to the illusion that it might be enough merely to retrain those
unemployed workers, foreign and native-born, already in the country -- as if all that is needed to produce an engineer or
a science Ph.D. is a few evening classes. Cognitive dissonance permeates the national debate, with skepticism and
denial masking the country's pressing labor needs. As one immigration policy expert put it, playing off the political
slogans of two decades, "W e're a reluctant immigration country." Still, even as the Sarrazin controversy raged in the
media last fall, the ruling coalition was quietly considering a package of measures to attract more global talent from
abroad.
Germany's governing "black-yellow" coalition of CDU/CSU conservatives and Free Democratic Party economic liberals is
aware of the need to modernize the country's approach to high-skilled immigration. But divisions among the parties
hamstring the government. Every faction and related ministry has its own proposal. One would lower the minimum salary
high-end workers must earn in order to qualify for permanent residence; another would allow employers seeking to hire
skilled foreigners to bypass the requirement that they first try to fill the jobs with German nationals; still another would
extend from one to two years the period that university students are permitted to stay in Germany after graduation. The
most sweeping proposal would replace Germany's existing admissions policy, which like the U.S. system is dependent on
a job offer from an employer, with a point system modeled on the Canadian approach. In Germany, business groups
generally favor a points-based policy: they believe it would signal that the country is open for business and doing all it
can to attract the best and brightest. (Employers in the United States strongly oppose a point system, preferring a policy
that allows them to choose and sponsor individual employees.)
Part of the problem is that no one, in Germany or elsewhere, understands very much about what attracts high-end
knowledge workers. Immigration policy plainly matters to potential immigrants, and the terms of a worker's visa --
whether the worker has the option of staying permanently or whether his spouse can accompany him and also work --
can make the difference between an appealing and an unappealing destination country. As it is now, the German visa
process is notoriously cumbersome. Employers and immigrants alike complain about official nitpicking, long waits, and
prolonged negotiations with authorities. Unfortunately, most of the changes under consideration in Berlin are small
steps, and the governing coalition keeps putting off a decision. At most, insiders say, there may be minor adjustments
made to the required minimum salary or to labor-market tests, but not enough, most business representatives believe,
to make a difference in Germany's appeal to highly skilled immigrants.
W hy else might a financial analyst from Beijing choose Frankfurt over Singapore? W hat are the respective advantages of
Silicon Valley and Bangalore? Every academic discipline has its own answers to these questions: economists point to
wage and income levels, social scientists cite social networks, and immigration policymakers argue for bureaucratic
initiatives such as recruitment and welcome centers. The urban studies analyst Richard Florida theorizes that "the
creative class" is attracted primarily by what he calls the "three T's": technology, talent (concentrations of other highly
educated, productive people), and tolerance (as evidenced by not just racial and ethnic diversity but also the percentage
of "high bohemians" and gay people in the population). Y et Florida's creative class is very broadly defined -- by his
account, one-third of U.S. workers, and perhaps an equal share worldwide, fall into the category. And it is unclear how
the theory applies to an Indian engineering student leaving a closely knit, traditional family to make a life halfway
around the world.
In some ways, it is surprising that Germany is not more appealing to skilled, educated immigrants. It has the most
robust economy in Europe. It is the second-largest exporter in the world. Its firms are on the cutting edge of applied and
industrial technology. German wages fall in the midrange of European salaries. German universities are solid, if not
exceptional -- and free. Although the language is difficult, many German companies have an international reach, with
operations in emerging economies such as China -- a fact not lost on young Chinese people making the choice about
where to go. "I chose to come to Germany because the universities are free," one Chinese financial analyst working in an
international bank in Frankfurt told me. "And if I decide I don't want to stay, I hope to be able to go back to China with
the company I'm working for."
Even accounting for size, Germany still attracts far fewer international students than the United States. But the numbers
arriving each year show that the country appeals more effectively to students than to adult workers. The challenge is
convincing these young people to stay. And as economic opportunities improve in China and India, that is getting harder
and harder for all W estern nations.
Germany's track record on immigration is also an obstacle to attracting and retaining talent. Germany is a very diverse
country: its foreign-born population is the largest in Europe. Twenty percent of residents were either born abroad or have
what Germans call a "migration background," meaning that they are the children of immigrants. And the country's W orld
W ar II history has made many Germans intensely sensitive to even the appearance of intolerance. An academic study of
discrimination has attracted considerable attention in recent months. Two economists at the University of Konstanz
tracked employers' responses to identical resumés from applicants with German-and Turkish-sounding names and found
that the callback rate was 14 percent higher for applications sent under the signature Tobias Hartmann than for those
sent under Fatih Y ildiz. These results were not as bad as they might have been: a similar study conducted in the United
States in 2004 found that applicants with white-sounding names got 50 percent more callbacks from prospective
employers than those whose names appeared to be African American. But the research has been much talked about in
Germany, including among knowledge workers deciding whether or not to stay in the country.
The Sarrazin controversy has not helped matters. According to one survey carried out two months after the publication of
the book, 36 percent of the public felt that Germany was being "overrun by foreigners"; 58 percent thought the nation's
four million Muslims should have their religious practices "significantly curbed." And the roiling national debate is opening
old wounds. Even many highly successful immigrants with deep roots in Germany say that they feel they will never be
fully accepted. As one rising young Berlin academic born in Turkey told me, "I'm a German citizen. I have a German child.
I'm devoting my career to educating the young people who will run the country in the next generation. But I'm still seen
as a foreigner."
The final variable in the calculus of would-be newcomers has to do with social conditions in the destination country.
These factors are even harder to parse than tolerance, but they come up often in conversations with highly skilled
immigrants. Newcomers know that German schools have not worked very well for the descendants of the
2009, just nine percent of young people with Turkish backgrounds passed the high school exit test required to attend
university, compared to 19 percent of Germans. And in the country's vocational training programs, where two-thirds of
young Germans qualify for future careers, only a quarter of youth with immigration backgrounds are enrolled. Although
social scientists argue that these poor outcomes are due largely to the
many recently arrived knowledge workers still worry that German schools will fail their children, too, particularly if the
children look foreign, with dark skin or Asian features. Foreign university graduates thinking about staying in Germany
worry about the entrenched seniority systems that often make it hard to rise in German companies. Others are concerned
that they will not be able to penetrate German social and professional networks, or that speaking anything short of
perfect German will stymie their careers. Still others worry about the myriad regulatory obstacles to starting their own
businesses.
CHASING THE DEUTSCH DREAM
German policymakers are beginning to connect these dots. The one immigration initiative that seems to be gaining
momentum in the government aims to speed integration by addressing some of the social and economic rigidity that so
concerns many new arrivals. The law would streamline the process for recognizing the educational credentials foreigners
bring with them to Germany. This alone will not transform the stratified social order: a study this fall by a German think
tank confirmed previous research showing that it is harder to move up the social ladder in Germany than in any other
country in Europe. But the proposed new law would be an important first step in a nation where careers depend on formal
qualifications. It could help as many as 300,000 university-educated immigrants already in Germany and working below
their skill levels -- and it would send a positive signal to potential newcomers abroad.
Still, re-creating the American dream in Germany may not be the whole answer. Skilled immigrants considering whether
to stay or go cite other German advantages, including the country's ample social safety net, the solidity of its economy,
and, somewhat paradoxically, the predictability of its regulated labor market. "Y ou can make a lot more money in
America. Y ou can rise a lot faster," one Chinese IT specialist told me. "But here in Germany, I and my family -- we live a
good life. The health care, the schools, the vacations; this isn't what drew me here, but it's why we are going to stay."
Few German employers looking for highly skilled workers are advertising in anything like these terms -- but that just
proves how little is known about what attracts global brain power.
In part, this lack of knowledge reflects public ambivalence. As much as developed countries need highly skilled workers,
voters are not sure they want to deal with the cultural difference they bring -- and it is no accident that Germany's ruling
coalition was all but paralyzed last fall as it tried to address the issue. Germans are almost as reluctant about change as
they are about immigration, and Germany will never be the world's number one destination for highly skilled immigrants.
Still, the acute shortages looming in the years ahead are pushing people both inside and outside the German
government to ask questions earlier than in some other countries -- and perhaps that in itself will count for something
with the next generation of knowledge workers considering where to move.
Deutschland schafft sich ab (Germany does away withGastarbeiter (German for "guest workers"), a group of immigrant laborers whoGastarbeiter. In 2001, aMittelstand, which sustainGoodbye(Goodbye Germany! The Emigrants). And yet there is no broad-based political will toGastarbeiter: InGastarbeiter's limited educational backgrounds,C opyright © 2002-2010 by the C ouncil on Foreign Relations, Inc.
A ll rights reserved. To request permission to distribute or reprint this article, please fill out and submit a
P ermissions Request Form. If you plan to use this article in a coursepack or academic website,A G-Zero World
The New Economic Club W ill Produce Conflict, Not Cooperation
Ian Bremmer and Nouriel Roubini
I AN BREMMER is President of
Market
Roubini Global Economics
T his is not a G-20 w orld. Over the past several months, the expanded group of leading economies has gone from a
w ould-be concert of nations to a cacophony of competing voices as the urgency of the financial crisis has w aned and the
diversity of political and economic values w ithin the group has asserted itself. Nor is there a viable G-2 -- a U.S.-Chinese
solution for pressing transnational problems -- because Beijing has no interest in accepting the burdens that come w ith
international leadership. Nor is there a G-3 alternative, a grouping of the United States, Europe, and Japan that might
ride to the rescue.
T oday, the United States lacks the resources to continue as the primary provider of global public goods. Europe is fully
occupied for the moment w ith saving the eurozone. Japan is likew ise tied dow n w ith complex political and economic
problems at home. None of these pow ers’ governments has the time, resources, or domestic political capital needed for
a new bout of international heavy lifting. Meanw hile, there are no credible answ ers to transnational challenges w ithout
the direct involvement of emerging pow ers such as Brazil, China, and I ndia. Y et these countries are far too focused on
domestic development to w elcome the burdens that come w ith new responsibilities abroad.
We are now living in a G-Zero w orld, one in w hich no single country or bloc of countries has the political and economic
leverage -- or the w ill -- to drive a truly international agenda. T he result w ill be intensified conflict on the international
stage over vitally important issues, such as international macroeconomic coordination, financial regulatory reform, trade
policy, and climate change. T his new order has far-reaching implications for the global economy, as companies around
the w orld sit on enormous stockpiles of cash, w aiting for the current era of political and economic uncertainty to pass.
Many of them can expect an extended w ait.
T HE OLD BOY S’ CLUB
Until the mid-1990s, the G-7 w as the international bargaining table of greatest importance. I ts members shared a
common set of values and a faith that democracy and market-driven capitalism w ere the systems most likely to generate
lasting peace and prosperity.
I n 1997, the U.S.-dominated G-7 became the U.S.-dominated G-8, as U.S. and European policymakers pulled Russia into
the club. T his change did not reflect a shift in the w orld’s balance of pow er. I t w as simply an effort to bolster Russia’s
fragile democracy and help prevent the country from sliding back into communism or nationalist militarism. T he
transition from the G-7 to the G-8 did not challenge assumptions about the virtues of representative government or the
dangers of extensive state management of economic grow th.
T he recent financial crisis and global market meltdow n have sent a much larger shock w ave through the international
system than anything that follow ed the collapse of the Soviet bloc. I n September 2008, fears that the global economy
stood on the brink of catastrophe hastened the inevitable transition to the G-20, an organization that includes the
w orld’s largest and most important emerging-market states. T he first gatherings of the club -- in Washington in
November 2008 and London in April 2009 -- produced an agreement on joint monetary and fiscal expansion, increased
funding for the I nternational Monetary Fund (I MF), and new rules for financial institutions. T hese successes came mainly
because all the members felt threatened by the same plagues at the same time.
But as the economic recovery began, the sense of crisis abated in some countries. I t became clear that China and other
large developing economies had suffered less damage and w ould recover faster than the w orld’s w ealthiest countries.
Chinese and I ndian banks had been less exposed than Western ones to the contagion effects from the meltdow n of U.S.
and European banks. Moreover, China’s foreign reserves had protected its government and banks from the liquidity panic
that took hold in the West. Beijing’s ability to direct state spending tow ard infrastructure projects quickly generated new
jobs, easing fears that the decline in U.S. and European consumer demand might trigger large-scale unemployment and
civil unrest in China.
As China and other emerging countries rebounded, the West’s fear and frustration grew more intense. I n the United
States, stubbornly high unemployment and fears of a double-dip recession fueled a rise in antigovernment activism and
shifted pow er to the Republicans. Governments fell out of favor in France and Germany -- and lost elections in Japan and
the United Kingdom. Fiscal crises provoked intense public anger from Greece to I reland and the Baltic states to Spain.
Meanw hile, Brazil, China, I ndia, T urkey, and other developing countries moved forw ard as the developed w orld remained
stuck in an anemic recovery. (I ronically, the only major developing country that has struggled to recover is the
petrostate Russia, the first state w elcomed into the G-7 club.) As the w ealthy and the developing states’ needs and
interests began to diverge, the G-20 and other international institutions lost the sense of urgency they needed to
produce coordinated and coherent multilateral policy responses.
Politicians in Western countries, battered by criticism that they have failed to produce a robust recovery, have blamed
scapegoats overseas. U.S.-Chinese political tensions have risen significantly over the past several months. China
continues to defy calls from Washington to allow the value of its currency to rise substantially. Policymakers in Beijing
insist that they must protect their country during a delicate moment in its development, as law makers in Washington
become more serious about taking action against Chinese trade and currency policies that they say are unfair. I n the
past three years, there has been a sharp spike in the number of domestic trade and World T rade Organization cases that
China and the United States have filed against each other. Meanw hile, the G-20 has gone from a modestly effective
international institution to an active arena of conflict.
T HE EMPT Y DRI VER’S SEAT
T here is nothing new about this bickering and inaction. Four decades after the Nuclear Nonproliferation T reaty, for
example, the major pow ers still have not agreed on how to build and maintain an effective nonproliferation regime that
can halt the spread of the w orld’s most dangerous w eapons and technologies. I n fact, global defense policy has alw ays
been essentially a zero-sum game, as one country or bloc of countries w orks to maximize its defense capabilities in
w ays that (deliberately or indirectly) challenge the military preeminence of its rivals.
I nternational commerce is a different game; trade can benefit all players. But the divergence of economic interests in
the w ake of the financial crisis has undermined global economic cooperation, throw ing a w rench into the gears of
globalization. I n the past, the global economy has relied on a hegemon -- the United Kingdom in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries and the United States in the tw entieth century -- to create the security framew ork necessary for
free markets, free trade, and capital mobility. But the combination of Washington’s declining international clout, on the
one hand, and sharp policy disagreements, on the other -- both betw een developed and developing states and betw een
the United States and Europe -- has created a vacuum of international leadership just at the moment w hen it is most
needed.
For the past 20 years, w hatever their differences on security issues, governments of the w orld’s major developed and
developing states have had common economic goals. T he grow th of China and I ndia provided Western consumers w ith
access to the w orld’s fastest-grow ing markets and helped U.S. and European policymakers manage inflation through the
import of inexpensively produced goods and services. T he United States, Europe, and Japan have helped developing
economies create jobs by buying huge volumes of their exports and by maintaining relative stability in international
politics.
But for the next 20 years, negotiations on economic and trade issues are likely to be driven by competition just as much
as recent debates over nuclear nonproliferation and climate change have. T he Doha Round is as dead as the dodo, and
the World T rade Organization cannot manage the surge of protectionist pressures that has emerged w ith the global
slow dow n.
Conflicts over trade liberalization have recently pitted the United States, the European Union, Brazil, China, I ndia, and
other emerging economies against one another as each government looks to protect its ow n w orkers and industries,
often at the expense of outsiders. Officials in many European countries have complained that I reland’s corporate tax
rate is too low and last year pushed the I rish government to accept a bailout it needed but did not w ant. German voters
are grousing about the need to bail out poorer European countries, and the citizens of southern European nations are
attacking their governments’ unw illingness to continue spending beyond their means.
Before last November’s G-20 summit in Seoul, Brazilian and I ndian officials joined their U.S. and European counterparts
to complain that China manipulates the value of its currency. Y et w hen the Americans raised the issue during the forum
itself, Brazil’s finance minister complained that the U.S. policy of “quantitative easing” amounted to much the same
unfair practice, and Germany’s foreign minister described U.S. policy as “clueless.”
Other intractable disagreements include debates over subsidies for farmers in the United States and Europe, the
protection of intellectual property rights, and the imposition of antidumping measures and countervailing duties.
Concerns over the behavior of sovereign w ealth funds have restricted the ability of some of them to take controlling
positions in Western companies, particularly in the United States. And China’s rush to lock dow n reliable long-term
access to natural resources -- w hich has led Beijing to aggressively buy commodities in Africa, Latin America, and other
emerging markets -- is further stoking conflict w ith Washington.
Asset and financial protectionism are on the rise, too. A Chinese state-ow ned oil company attempted to purchase the
U.S. energy firm Unocal in 2005, and a year later, the state-ow ned Dubai Ports World tried to purchase a company that
w ould allow it to operate several U.S. ports: both ignited a political furor in Washington. T his w as simply the precursor
to similar acts of investment protectionism in Europe and Asia. I n fact, there are few established international
guidelines for foreign direct investment -- defining w hat qualifies as “critical infrastructure,” for example -- and this is
precisely the sort of politically charged problem that w ill not be addressed successfully anytime soon on the
international stage.
T he most important source of international conflict may w ell come from debates over how best to ensure that an
international economic meltdow n never happens again. Future global monetary and financial stability w ill require much
greater international coordination on the regulation and supervision of the financial system. Eventually, they may even
require a global super-regulator, given that capital is mobile w hile regulatory policies remain national. But
disagreements on these issues run deep. T he governments of many developing countries fear that the creation of tighter
international rules for financial firms w ould bind them more tightly to the financial systems of the very Western
economies that they blame for creating the recent crisis. And there are significant disagreements even among advanced
economies on how to reform the system of regulation and supervision of financial institutions.
Global trade imbalances remain w ide and are getting even w ider, increasing the risk of currency w ars -- not only
betw een the United States and China but also among other emerging economies. T here is nothing new about these
sorts of disagreements. But the still fragile state of the global economy makes the need to resolve them much more
urgent, and the vacuum of international leadership w ill make their resolution profoundly difficult to achieve.
WHO NEEDS T O DOLLAR?
Follow ing previous crises in emerging markets, such as the Asian financial meltdow n of the late 1990s, policymakers in
those economies committed themselves to maintaining w eak currencies, running current account surpluses, and selfinsuring
against liquidity runs by accumulating huge foreign exchange reserves. T his strategy grew in part from a
mistrust that the I MF could be counted on to act as the lender of last resort. Deficit countries, such as the United
States, see such accumulations of reserves as a form of trade mercantilism that prevents undervalued currencies from
appreciating. Emerging-market economies, in turn, complain that U.S. fiscal and current account deficits could eventually
cause the collapse of the U.S. dollar, even as these deficits help build up the dollar assets demanded by those countries
accumulating reserves. T his is a rerun of the old T riffin dilemma, an economic observation of w hat happens w hen the
country that produces the reserve currency must run deficits to provide international liquidity, deficits that eventually
debase the currency’s value as a stable international reserve.
Meanw hile, debates over alternatives to the U.S. dollar, including that of giving a greater role to Special Draw ing Rights
(an international reserve asset based on a basket of five national currencies created by the I MF to supplement gold and
dollar reserves), as China has recommended, are going now here, largely because Washington has no interest in any
move that w ould undermine the central role of the dollar. Nor is it likely that China’s yuan w ill soon supplant the dollar
as a major reserve currency, because for the yuan to do so, Beijing w ould have to allow its exchange rate to fluctuate,
reduce its controls on capital inflow s and outflow s, liberalize its domestic capital markets, and create markets for yuandenominated
debt. T hat is a long-term process that w ould present many near-term threats to China’s political and
economic stability.
I n addition, energy producers are resisting policies aimed at stabilizing price volatility through a more flexible energy
supply. Meanw hile, net energy exporters, especially Russia, continue to use threats to halt the flow of gas as a primary
foreign policy w eapon against neighboring states. Net energy consumers, for their part, are resisting policies, such as
carbon taxes, that w ould reduce their dependency on fossil fuels. Similar tensions derive from the sharply rising prices of
food and other commodities. Conflicts over these issues come at a time w hen economic anxiety is high and no single
country or bloc of countries has the clout to help drive a truly international approach to resolving them.
From 1945 until 1990, the global balance of pow er w as defined primarily by relative differences in military capability. I t
w as not market-moving innovation or cultural dynamism that bolstered the Soviet bloc’s prominence w ithin a bipolar
international system. I t w as raw military pow er. T oday, it is the centrality of China and other emerging pow ers to the
future of the global economy, not the numbers of their citizens under arms or the w eapons at their disposal, that make
their choices crucial for the United States’ future.
T his is the core of the G-Zero dilemma. T he phrase “collective security” conjures up NAT O and its importance for peace
and prosperity across Europe. But as the eurozone crisis vividly demonstrates, there is no collective economic security in
a globalized economy. Whereas Europe’s interest rates once converged based on the assumption that southern European
countries w ere immune to default risks and eastern European states w ere lined up to join the euro, now there is fear of
a contagion w ithin the w alls that might one day bring dow n the entire eurozone enterprise.
Beyond Europe, those w ho make policy, w hether in a market-based democracy such as the United States or an
authoritarian capitalist state such as China, must w orry first and foremost about grow th and jobs at home. Ambitions to
bolster the global economy are a distant second. T here is no longer a Washington consensus, but nor w ill there ever be
a Beijing consensus, because Chinese-style state capitalism is designed to meet China’s unique needs. I t is that rare
product that China has no interest in exporting.
I ndeed, because each government must w ork to build domestic security and prosperity to fit its ow n unique political,
economic, geographic, cultural, and historical circumstances, state capitalism is a system that must be unique to every
country that practices it. T his is w hy, despite pledges recorded in G-20 communiqués to “avoid the mistakes of the
past,” protectionism is alive and w ell. I t is w hy the process of creating a new international financial architecture is
unlikely to create a structure that complies w ith any credible building code. And it is w hy the G-Zero era is more likely to
produce protracted conflict than anything resembling a new Bretton Woods.
Eurasia Group [1], the political risk consulting firm, and the author of T he End of the Free[2]. NOURI EL ROUBI NI is Professor of Economics at New Y ork University’s Stern School of Business, Chair of[3], and a co-author of Crisis Economics [4].Copyright © 2002-2010 by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.
All rights reserved. To request permission to distribute or reprint this article, please fill out and submit a
Permissions Request Form. If you plan to use this article in a coursepack or academic website, visitCopyright Clearance Center
to clear permission.This article was downloaded by
calibre from http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67339/ian-bremmer-and-nouriel-roubini/a-g